INTRODUCEDIN TO APPRIOUR D

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ITEM 1 - CIRCUIT BREAKER ITEM 2 - FUSE, AXIAL LEAD / CARTRIDGE ITEM 3 - FUSE, HIGH CHREAK ITEM 4 - FUSE, FLOG-IN

MC454-0026 / MC454-0032 NE451-0009 NE451-0016 HE451-0018

PATTABLE NOTES AND CAUGUES!

THE POLICHTING TRBLE LIGHTS PAILLING HOURS AND CAMBES WHICH WERE CONSIDERED IN DERIVING PAILING HOURS AND EFFECTS ANALYBLE (THEA'S) FOR THE ITEMS LIGHTED ABOVE;

PAULINS MODE	PAILUR CARE	CTRCUIT	PUER HC451-0009	FC188	PUER MC451-6018
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CHOUCE, FAILS TO CLOSE	(a) Structural Pailure (b) Contemination (c) Vibration (d) Mechanical Shock (e) Processing Amonaly (f) Thermal Stress	книни	 	жжжж	****
FALLS CLOSED, FALLS TO OPEN, (MESENAICALLY)	(a) Structural Fallure (b) Contamination (c) Vibration (d) Mechanical Shock (e) Processing Anomaly	ммжж	•	•	•
FAILS TO INTERBUPT UNDER OVERLOAD *	(a) Structural Failure	H			

* KESS DEETE PROSE.

APPENDIX D ITEM 4 - FUSE, PLUG-IN TYPE ME451-0018-XXXX

DISPOSITION & RATIONALS

(A) DESIGN, (B) TEST, (C) INSPECTION, (D) FAILURE HISTORY:

(A) DESIGN

HERMETICALLY-SEALED, PANEL MOUNTED PLUG-IN TYPE, ENCLOSURE PROTECTED.

(B) TEST

QUALIFICATION/CERTIFICATION

QUALIFIED TO MC451-0010. QUALIFICATION/CERTIFICATION TEST AND ANALYSIS COMPLETE. CERTIFICATION TESTS INCLUDE:

TEST		CAUSE CONTROL							
<u> </u>	a	ь	c	4	e	f			
ACCEPTANCE VISUAL DC RESISTANCE INTERRUPTION CAPACITY TERMINAL STRENGTH THERMAL SHOCK HUMIDITY MECHANICAL SHOCK (78-G, 30 SHOCKS TOTAL) FLIGHT VIBRATION (10-G SINE AND 0.2 g ² /HZ, 10 MINUTES PER AXIS) LEAKAGE (FINE AND GROSS) TIME CURRENT CHARACTERISTICS	x x x	x	X	x	X X X X X	х			

APPENDIX D ITEM 4 CONT'D

ACCEPTANCE AND SCREENING

ALL PRODUCTION UNITS SUBJECTED TO 100% ACCEPTANCE TESTING WHICH INCLUDES THE POLLOWING SCREENS:

TEST		CAUSE CONTROL							
	a	ь	٦	d	e	ľ			
EXAMINATION SINE VIBRATION LEAKAGE DC RESISTANCE RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION BURN-IN (100% RATED CURRENT, 2 HR MINIMUM)	x	x x x	х		X X X				

(C) INSPECTION

RECEIVING INSPECTION (FAILURE CAUSE & b)

PERFORMS VISUAL, AND DIMENSIONAL EXAMINATION OF ALL INCOMING PARTS. FUSE ELEMENT MATERIAL IS VERIFIED. CERTIFICATION RECORDS/TEST REPORTS ARE MAINTAINED CERTIFYING MATERIALS AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL (FAILURE CAUSE b)

CONTAMINATION CONTROL PROCESSES AND CORROSION PROTECTION PROVISIONS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. FUSE CLEANED PRIOR TO AND AFTER ELEMENT SOLDERING.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION (FAILURE CAUSE a,b,e)

MATERIAL (SPOOL), REVERIFIED PRIOR TO START OF EACH LOT BUILD. FUSE ELEMENT PLATING THICKNESS VERIFICATION AFTER PLATING. VISUAL INSPECTION OF CRITICAL DIMENSIONS PERFORMED IN-PROCESS AND AFTER ASSEMBLY.

FUSE ASSEMBLY PERSONNEL ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR DETAILED IN- PROCESS CHECKS INCLUDING THOSE FOR SOLDER AND JOINTS, FOREIGN MATTER, CHIPPED BODY, LEADS FOR NICKS UNDER 20X MAGNIFICATION, LINK, AND FERRULE DEFECTS. ALL MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS (MIP'S).

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APPENDIX D ITEM 4 CONT'D

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION (NDE) (FAILURE CAUSE b)

HERMETIC SEAL IS VERIFIED WITH FLUID/DYE PENETRANT UNDER 20X MAGNIFICATION.

CRITICAL PROCESSES (FAILURE CAUSE a,e)

SOLDERING OPERATIONS ARE VERIFIED BY QUALITY CONTROL (QC). PERIODIC EYE EXAMINATIONS FOR ALL ASSEMBLERS ARE VERIFIED.

TESTING (FAILURE CAUSE a,b,c,e)

ACCEPTANCE TEST OBSERVED AND VERIFIED BY QC, INCLUDING VIBRATION, BURN-IN, DIMENSION CHECK, WEIGHT, DC RESISTANCE, CASE LEAKAGE.

HANDLING/PACKAGING (FAILURE CAUSE c,d)

PARTS PACKAGED AND PROTECTED ARE SAMPLE INSPECTED AND VERIFIED BY QC TO APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS.

(D) PAILURE HISTORY

EXTENSIVE PRIOR PROGRAM HISTORY (APOLLO, SKYLAB). NO GENERIC FAILURE MODES EXIST.

PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY (NASA):

DESIGN

RELIABILITY

M. HOVE

RELIABILITY

QUALITY

J. COURSEN

QUALITY

APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY (NASA):

RELIABILITY

QUALITY

QUALITY

APPROVED BY:

APPROVED B